IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/glofin/v21y2010i3p293-303.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why do healthy firms freeze their defined-benefit pension plans?

Author

Listed:
  • Atanasova, Christina
  • Hrazdil, Karel

Abstract

We examine the firms' decisions in freezing their defined-benefit pension plans and the effect it has on shareholders' wealth. Plan freezes help relieve sponsors of the implicit promises made to employees regarding future compensation. We find evidence that a pension plan freeze has a positive impact on sponsors' equity returns and credit ratings. Firms that choose to freeze their pension plans experience an increase in equity return and a decrease in the probability of a credit downgrade.

Suggested Citation

  • Atanasova, Christina & Hrazdil, Karel, 2010. "Why do healthy firms freeze their defined-benefit pension plans?," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 293-303.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:21:y:2010:i:3:p:293-303
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1044-0283(10)00040-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy I. Bulow & Randall Morck & Lawrence H. Summers, 1987. "How Does the Market Value Unfunded Pension Liabilities?," NBER Chapters, in: Issues in Pension Economics, pages 81-110, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Franzoni, Francesco, 2009. "Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions to pension contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 491-518, June.
    3. Daniel, Kent, et al, 1997. "Measuring Mutual Fund Performance with Characteristic-Based Benchmarks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1035-1058, July.
    4. Stone, M, 1987. "A Financing Explanation For Overfunded Pension Plan Terminations," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 317-326.
    5. Shaw, Kenneth W., 2008. "Revised pension rules and the cost of debt," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 3-25.
    6. Jin, Li & Merton, Robert C. & Bodie, Zvi, 2006. "Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-26, July.
    7. Francesco Franzoni & José M. Marin, 2005. "Portable Alphas from Pension Mispricing," Working Papers 227, Barcelona School of Economics.
    8. Feldstein, Martin & Seligman, Stephanie, 1981. "Pension Funding, Share Prices, and National Savings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 36(4), pages 801-824, September.
    9. Thomas, Jacob K., 1989. "Why do firms terminate their overfunded pension plans?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 361-398, November.
    10. Joshua D. Rauh, 2009. "Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate Pension Plans," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(7), pages 2487-2533, July.
    11. Joshua D. Rauh, 2006. "Investment and Financing Constraints: Evidence from the Funding of Corporate Pension Plans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(1), pages 33-71, February.
    12. Francesco Franzoni & José M. Marín, 2006. "Pension Plan Funding and Stock Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 921-956, April.
    13. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2005. "Retirement and the Evolution of Pension Structure," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 40(2).
    14. Martin, Linda J. & Henderson, Glenn V., 1983. "On Bond Ratings and Pension Obligations: A Note," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 463-470, December.
    15. Mitchell A. Petersen, 1992. "Pension Reversions and Worker-Stockholder Wealth Transfers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(3), pages 1033-1056.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Denise A. Jones, 2014. "When Do Companies Fund Their Defined Benefit Pension Plans?," Accounting & Taxation, The Institute for Business and Finance Research, vol. 6(1), pages 13-23.
    2. Li, Zezeng & Kara, Alper, 2022. "Pension de-risking choice and firm risk: Traditional versus innovative strategies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    3. Denise A. Jones, 2013. "Changes in the Funded Status of Retirement Plans after the Adoption of SFAS No. 158: Economic Improvement or Balance Sheet Management," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 30(3), pages 1099-1132, September.
    4. Himick, Darlene, 2016. "Actuarialism as biopolitical and disciplinary technique," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 22-44.
    5. Choy, Helen & Lin, Juichia & Officer, Micah S., 2014. "Does freezing a defined benefit pension plan affect firm risk?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-21.
    6. Tobias Witter & Thorsten Sellhorn & Jens Müller & Vicky Kiosse, 2022. "Balance sheet smoothing," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0006, Berlin School of Economics.
    7. Limin Zhang & Ruilin Tian & Jun Chen, 2022. "Text Mining for U.S. Pension De-Risking Analysis," Risks, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18, February.
    8. Wei Huang & Bin Qiu, 2022. "Passive insider trading before pension freezes," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 607-631, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nakajima, Kan & Sasaki, Takafumi, 2010. "Unfunded pension liabilities and stock returns," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-63, January.
    2. Hieu V. Phan & Shantaram P. Hegde, 2013. "Pension Contributions and Firm Performance: Evidence from Frozen Defined Benefit Plans," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 42(2), pages 373-411, June.
    3. Goto, Shingo & Yanase, Noriyoshi, 2021. "Pension return assumptions and shareholder-employee risk-shifting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    4. Berchtold, Demian & Dichter, Oliver & Loderer, Claudio & Waelchli, Urs, 2021. "Pension risk and corporate investment distortion," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
    5. Almaghrabi, Khadija S., 2023. "Non‐operating risk and cash holdings: Evidence from pension risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    6. Rauh, Joshua D. & Stefanescu, Irina & Zeldes, Stephen P., 2020. "Cost saving and the freezing of corporate pension plans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    7. Michael J. Alderson & Neil L. Seitz, 2013. "Pension Policy and the Value of Corporate-Level Investment," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 42(2), pages 413-440, June.
    8. Tao, Qizhi & Chen, Carl & Lu, Rui & Zhang, Ting, 2017. "Underfunding or distress? An analysis of corporate pension underfunding and the cross-section of expected stock returns," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 116-133.
    9. Iqbal Owadally, 2014. "Tail risk in pension funds: an analysis using ARCH models and bilinear processes," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 301-331, August.
    10. F. Wang & Ting Zhang, 2014. "The effect of unfunded pension liabilities on corporate bond ratings, default risk, and recovery rate," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 43(4), pages 781-802, November.
    11. Boubaker, Sabri & Gounopoulos, Dimitrios & Nguyen, Duc Khuong & Paltalidis, Nikos, 2017. "Assessing the effects of unconventional monetary policy and low interest rates on pension fund risk incentives," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 35-52.
    12. Franzoni, Francesco, 2009. "Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions to pension contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 491-518, June.
    13. Yong-Chul Shin & Kun Yu & Neil Fargher, 2016. "Do investors misprice components of net periodic pension cost?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 56(3), pages 845-878, September.
    14. Luca Larcher & Francis Breedon, 2020. "Discounting and the market valuation of defined benefit pensions," Working Papers 932, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    15. Michael Kisser & John Kiff & Mauricio Soto, 2017. "Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(5), pages 1213-1255, December.
    16. Joshua D. Rauh & Irina Stefanescu & Stephen P. Zeldes, 2020. "Cost Saving and the Freezing of Corporate Pension Plans," NBER Working Papers 27251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Chen, Xuanjuan & Yao, Tong & Yu, Tong & Zhang, Ting, 2014. "Learning and incentive: A study on analyst response to pension underfunding," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 26-42.
    18. An, Heng & Huang, Zhaodan & Zhang, Ting, 2013. "What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 597-613.
    19. Bartram, Söhnke M., 2018. "In good times and in bad: Defined-benefit pensions and corporate financial policy," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 331-351.
    20. Chen, An, 2011. "A risk-based model for the valuation of pension insurance," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 401-409.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:glofin:v:21:y:2010:i:3:p:293-303. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620162 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.