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Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players

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  • Zapal, Jan

Abstract

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate.

Suggested Citation

  • Zapal, Jan, 2016. "Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 235-242.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:98:y:2016:i:c:p:235-242
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Simple Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    2. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2022. "Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 69-104, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic decision-making; Endogenous status-quo; Spatial bargaining; Legislative bargaining;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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