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Competitive environments and protective behavior

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Author Info
Borm, Peter
Estévez-Fernández, Arantza
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria

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Abstract

The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class the set of Nash equilibria is convex and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive environments such as unilaterally competitive games and rivalry games. Moreover, protective behavior within competitive environments is analyzed. For matrix games it is known that protective strategies profiles exactly correspond to proper equilibria. It is shown that this result can be extended to the class of unilaterally competitive games.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4TYYT6X-1/2/fe46f4a038fced9f2f8460f9e5536ec5
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 245-252
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:1:p:245-252

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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Related research
Keywords: Competitive environments Unilaterally competitive games Rivalry games Competition games Protective strategies;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kats, Amoz & Thisse, Jacques-Francois, 1992. "Unilaterally Competitive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 291-99.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," Discussion Papers 295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Borm, Peter & van Megen, Freek, 1998. "Protective and Prudent Behaviour in Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 167-175, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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