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Cyber deterrence with imperfect attribution and unverifiable signaling

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  • Welburn, Jonathan
  • Grana, Justin
  • Schwindt, Karen

Abstract

Motivated by the asymmetric information inherent to cyberwarfare, we examine a game of deterrence between an attacker and a defender in which the defender can signal its retaliatory capability but can only imperfectly attribute an attack. We show that there are equilibria in which the defender sends noisy signals to increase its expected payoff. In some equilibria, the defender can use signaling to deter an attacker and increase its payoff. In a different and somewhat counter-intuitive equilibrium, the defender can increase its expected payoff through signaling by luring the attacker to attack more.

Suggested Citation

  • Welburn, Jonathan & Grana, Justin & Schwindt, Karen, 2023. "Cyber deterrence with imperfect attribution and unverifiable signaling," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 306(3), pages 1399-1416.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:306:y:2023:i:3:p:1399-1416
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.021
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Dacorogna, Michel & Debbabi, Nehla & Kratz, Marie, 2023. "Building up cyber resilience by better grasping cyber risk via a new algorithm for modelling heavy-tailed data," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 311(2), pages 708-729.

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