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Reducing the time required to find the Kemeny ranking by exploiting a necessary condition for being a winner

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  • Rico, Noelia
  • Vela, Camino R.
  • Díaz, Irene

Abstract

The ranking aggregation problem is gaining attention in different application fields due to its connection with decision making. One of the most famous ranking aggregation methods can be traced back to Kemeny in 1959. Unfortunately, the problem of determining the result of the aggregation proposed by Kemeny, known as Kemeny ranking as it minimizes the number of pairwise discrepancies from a set of rankings given by voters, has been proved to be NP-hard, which unfortunately prevents practitioners from using this method in most real-life problems. In this work, we introduce two exact algorithms for determining the Kemeny ranking. The best of these algorithms guarantees a reasonable search time up to 14 alternatives, showing an important reduction of the execution time in comparison to other algorithms found in the literature. Moreover, a dataset of profiles of rankings is provided and a study of additional aspects of the votes that may have impact on the execution time required to determine the winning ranking is also detailed.

Suggested Citation

  • Rico, Noelia & Vela, Camino R. & Díaz, Irene, 2023. "Reducing the time required to find the Kemeny ranking by exploiting a necessary condition for being a winner," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 305(3), pages 1323-1336.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:305:y:2023:i:3:p:1323-1336
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Noelia Rico & Camino R. Vela & Raúl Pérez-Fernández & Irene Díaz, 2021. "Reducing the Computational Time for the Kemeny Method by Exploiting Condorcet Properties," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(12), pages 1-12, June.
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