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Quality risk in logistics outsourcing: A fourth party logistics perspective

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  • Huang, Min
  • Tu, Jun
  • Chao, Xiuli
  • Jin, Delong

Abstract

We investigate an outsourcing logistics risk management problem under a principal-agency framework. A fourth-party logistics firm (4PL) deputes a third-party logistics firm (3PL) to complete the tasks received from clients. The 4PL cannot observe the effort/investment level of the 3PL on the delivery quality but only on the ex post delivery quality. Thus, a contract based on delivery quality is proposed to stimulate the 3PL to exert optimal effort/investment for the outsourced task. First, we derive the optimal contract contents both in symmetric and asymmetric information settings and show that in the asymmetric information setting, although a menu of contracts can induce the 3PL to tell the truth, asymmetric efficiency information can lead to a drop in delivery quality as well as in system-wide welfare. Then, to deal with this issue in the asymmetric information setting, we introduce two contracts: noncooperative bargaining and cooperative bargaining contracts. We find that the cooperative bargaining contract can ensure the 3PL exerts the maximum effort/investment level and achieves high-quality delivery and system-wide welfare. Finally, we extend our study to a case with discrete efficiency distribution and analyze various types of contracts as well as their implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Min & Tu, Jun & Chao, Xiuli & Jin, Delong, 2019. "Quality risk in logistics outsourcing: A fourth party logistics perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 276(3), pages 855-879.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:276:y:2019:i:3:p:855-879
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.01.049
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    3. Xiaohu Qian & Mingqiang Yin & Felix T. S. Chan & Kai Yue, 2023. "Winner Determination with Sustainable-Flexible Considerations Under Demand Uncertainty in Transportation Service Procurement Auctions," Networks and Spatial Economics, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 953-984, December.
    4. Cheng, Lihong & Guo, Xiaolong & Li, Xiaoxiao & Yu, Yugang, 2022. "Data-driven ordering and transshipment decisions for online retailers and logistics service providers," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    5. Mohammed Alkahtani, 2022. "Mathematical Modelling of Inventory and Process Outsourcing for Optimization of Supply Chain Management," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 10(7), pages 1-27, April.
    6. Mingqiang Yin & Min Huang & Xiaohu Qian & Dazhi Wang & Xingwei Wang & Loo Hay Lee, 2023. "Fourth-party logistics network design with service time constraint under stochastic demand," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 1203-1227, March.
    7. Wu, Yaobin & Huang, Jiazhou & Chen, Xiangfeng, 2024. "The information value of logistics platforms in a freight matching market," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 312(1), pages 227-239.
    8. Jun Tu & Liangdong Wan & Zijiao Sun, 2023. "Safety Improvement of Sustainable Coal Transportation in Mines: A Contract Design Perspective," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-21, January.
    9. Zheng, Zhijun & Li, Gang & Cheng, T.C.E & Wu, Feng, 2022. "Offline supplementary service strategies for the online marketplace: Third-party service or marketplace service?," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    10. Lou, Yaqi & Feng, Lipan & He, Shuguang & He, Zhen & Zhao, Xiukun, 2020. "Logistics service outsourcing choices in a retailer-led supply chain," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    11. Gu, Wei & Yu, Xiaoru & Zhang, Shichen & Yan, Xiangbin & Wang, Chen, 2023. "To outsource or not: Bike-share rebalancing strategies under the service quality deviation of a third party," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 310(2), pages 847-859.
    12. Pal Singh, Satender & Adhikari, Arnab & Majumdar, Adrija & Bisi, Arnab, 2022. "Does service quality influence operational and financial performance of third party logistics service providers? A mixed multi criteria decision making -text mining-based investigation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).

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