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Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment

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  • Christofides, Louis N.
  • McKenna, C. J.

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  • Christofides, Louis N. & McKenna, C. J., 1995. "Unemployment insurance and moral hazard in employment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 205-210, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:49:y:1995:i:2:p:205-210
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michael Baker & Samuel A. Rea, 1998. "Employment Spells And Unemployment Insurance Eligibility Requirements," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 80-94, February.
    2. Green, David A & Riddell, W Craig, 1997. "Qualifying for Unemployment Insurance: An Empirical Analysis," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(440), pages 67-84, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gutierrez, Italo A., 2016. "Job insecurity, unemployment insurance and on-the-job search. Evidence from older American workers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 228-245.
    2. Ohkusa, Y., 2000. "An Empirical Evidence of Moral Hazard due to Unemployment Benefits," ISER Discussion Paper 0511, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    3. Laura Khoury & Clément Brébion & Simon Briole, 2019. "Entitled to Leave: the Impact of Unemployment Insurance Eligibility on Employment Duration and Job Quality," Working Papers halshs-02393383, HAL.
    4. Rafael Lalive & Jan Ours & Josef Zweimüller, 2011. "Equilibrium unemployment and the duration of unemployment benefits," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 24(4), pages 1385-1409, October.
    5. Laura Khoury, 2021. "Unemployment Benefits and the Timing of Redundancies," Working Papers halshs-02057145, HAL.
    6. Albanese, Andrea & Picchio, Matteo & Ghirelli, Corinna, 2020. "Timed to Say Goodbye: Does Unemployment Benefit Eligibility Affect Worker Layoffs?," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    7. Konstantinos Tatsiramos & Jan C. Ours, 2014. "Labor Market Effects Of Unemployment Insurance Design," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 284-311, April.
    8. van Ours, Jan C. & Tuit, Sander, 2010. "How Changes in Unemployment Benefit Duration Affect the Inflow into Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 4691, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Baguelin, Olivier & Remillon, Delphine, 2014. "Unemployment insurance and management of the older workforce in a dual labor market: Evidence from France," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 245-264.
    10. Lester Lusher & Geoffrey C. Schnorr & Rebecca L.C. Taylor, 2022. "Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(2), pages 285-319, April.
    11. Laura Khoury, 2019. "Unemployment Benefits and the Timing of Redundancies: Evidence from Bunching," PSE Working Papers halshs-02057145, HAL.
    12. Peilu Zhang & Marco A. Palma, 2021. "Compulsory Versus Voluntary Insurance: An Online Experiment," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 106-125, January.
    13. Lalive, R. & van Ours, J.C. & Zweimüller, J., 2006. "How Changes in Potential Benefit Duration Affect Equilibrium Unemployment," Other publications TiSEM 9c1e2e2f-85cf-48b2-b608-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Zweimüller, Josef, 2018. "Unemployment insurance and the labor market," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 1-14.
    15. Yasushi Ohkusa, 2003. "Programme Evaluation of Unemployment Benefits in Japan: An Average Treatment Effect Approach," ISER Discussion Paper 0570, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    16. D. G. C. Britto, 2016. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Employment: Evidence from a Regression Kink Design," Working Papers wp1058, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    17. Ohkusa, Yasushi, 2004. "Programme evaluation of unemployment benefits in Japan: An average treatment effect approach," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 95-111, January.
    18. Bernardus Van Doornik & David Schoenherr & Janis Skrastins, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment and Firm-Worker Collusion," Working Papers Series 483, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.
    19. Diogo Britto, 2016. "Unemployment Insurance and the Duration of Employment: Theory and Evidence from a Regression Kink Design," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def048, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).

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