IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v40y1992i1p45-55.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic

Author

Listed:
  • Sertel, Murat R.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Sertel, Murat R., 1992. "The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 45-55, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:40:y:1992:i:1:p:45-55
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0165-1765(92)90243-R
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ismail Saglam, 2022. "Pareto gains of predonation in monopoly regulation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(4), pages 817-854, August.
    2. S. Akin & Brennan Platt & Murat Sertel, 2011. "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 147-162, June.
    3. Ismail Saglam, 2023. "Centralized bargaining with pre‐donation in a vertically related industry," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 91(3), pages 233-259, June.
    4. S. Nuray Akin & Murat R. Sertel, 2007. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary," Working Papers 0718, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    5. Zuleta, Hernando & Villaveces, Marta Juanita & Andonova, Veneta, 2013. "Conflict and negotiation in Colombia: Are pre-donations useful?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 105-117.
    6. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    7. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.
    8. Ismail Saglam, 2022. "Bridging bargaining theory with the regulation of a natural monopoly," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(3), pages 307-344, September.
    9. Hernando Zuleta & Juanita Villaveces, 2008. "Conflict and negotiation: a game theoretical approach," Documentos de Trabajo 5148, Universidad del Rosario.
    10. Saglam, Ismail, 2022. "Two-player bargaining problems with unilateral pre-donation," MPRA Paper 115203, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Saglam, Ismail, 2021. "Pareto Improvement in Monopoly Regulation Using Pre-Donation," MPRA Paper 109741, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Pre-bargaining Investment Implies a Pareto Ranking of Bargaining Solutions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 769-787, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:40:y:1992:i:1:p:45-55. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.