Oligopolistic competition among groups
AbstractIn this paper we study an oligopolistic equilibria in which (possibly few) corporations can create as many firms as they like. It is shown by means of two examples that under constant returns to scale, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria implies perf ect competition.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 36 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Corchón, Luis C., . "Oligopolistic Competition Among Groups," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4335, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Corchón, Luis C., . "Oligopolistic competition among groups," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/4205, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Luis Corchón, 1991. "Oligopolistic Competition Among Groups," Working Papers. Serie AD 1991-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Joao Carlos Correia Leitao, 2004. "Optimal Divisionalization for Selling Networks of Cable Television Services," Industrial Organization 0403004, EconWPA.
- Ziss, Steffen, 1999. "Divisionalization and strategic managerial incentives in oligopoly under uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(8), pages 1163-1187, November.
- Iwasa, Kazumichi & Kikuchi, Toru, 2007. "Strategic Divisionalization, Product Differentiation and International Competition," MPRA Paper 5120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Baye, Michael R. & Crocker, Keith J. & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization and franchising incentives with integral competing units," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 429-435, March.
- Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003.
"Licensing the market for technology,"
Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
info:hdl:10016/13388, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
- Ziss, Steffen, 1998. "Divisionalization and product differentiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 133-138, April.
- Miguel González-Maestre, 1993. "Divisionalization In Markets With Hetergeneous Goods," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-12, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- A. Mukherjee & U. Broll & S. Mukherjee, 2008. "Unionized labor market and licensing by a monopolist," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 59-79, February.
- Ziss, Steffen, 2007. "Hierarchies, intra-firm competition and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 237-260, April.
- Kazumichi, Iwasa & Toru, Kikuchi, 2007. "Cost Hetrogeneity and Strategic Divisionalization," MPRA Paper 5693, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Mukherjee, Soma & Broll, Udo & Mukherjee, Arijit, 2007. "Licensing by a monopolist and unionized labor market," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 09/07, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
- Tan, Guofu & Yuan, Lasheng, 2003. "Strategic incentives of divestitures of competing conglomerates," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(5), pages 673-697, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.