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Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Zhewei
  • Zhou, Lixue

Abstract

We study a two-player contest with one-sided incomplete information: One player’s valuation is publicly known and the other’s is his private information. The designer chooses the players’ move sequence (between simultaneous and sequential contests) and the information disclosure policy (between full and no disclosure). We find that if the uninformed player’s valuation is low, a simultaneous (resp. strong-lead sequential) contest with full disclosure is optimal when the valuation difference is large (resp. small); if the uninformed player’s valuation is high, a strong-lead sequential contest with full (resp. no) disclosure is optimal when the valuation difference is large (resp. small).

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Zhewei & Zhou, Lixue, 2022. "Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:212:y:2022:i:c:s0165176522000234
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jun Zhang & Junjie Zhou, 2016. "Information Disclosure in Contests: A Bayesian Persuasion Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(597), pages 2197-2217, November.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Information disclosure; Sequential contests; Simultaneous contests; One-sided incomplete information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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