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Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms

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  • Baumann, Florian
  • Friehe, Tim

Abstract

This article shows that insulating market outcomes from consumers’ misperceptions about product risk by compensating them fully for harm is not necessarily socially optimal. When firms offer products with different safety levels and consumers overestimate harm, incomplete compensation of product accident victims improves the allocation of consumers to firms. This effect can dominate the higher social costs arising from inefficient product safety levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2021. "Products liability, consumer misperceptions, and the allocation of consumers to firms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:198:y:2021:i:c:s0165176520304183
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109658
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
    2. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2006. "Markets, torts, and social inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 300-323, June.
    3. Miceli Thomas J. & Segerson Kathleen, 2013. "Liability versus Regulation for Dangerous Products When Consumers Vary in Their Susceptibility to Harm and May Misperceive Risk," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 9(3), pages 341-355, December.
    4. Chu, C.Y. Cyrus & Huang, Chen-Ying, 2004. "On the definition and efficiency of punitive damages," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 241-254, June.
    5. Florian Baumann & Alexander Rasch, 2020. "Exposing false advertising," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 1211-1245, August.
    6. Andrzej Baniak & Peter Grajzl, 2016. "Controlling Product Risks when Consumers Are Heterogeneously Overconfident: Producer Liability versus Minimum-Quality-Standard Regulation," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 172(2), pages 274-304, June.
    7. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Suo Wang, 2015. "Products Liability When Consumers Vary In Their Susceptibility To Harm And May Misperceive Risk," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 468-476, July.
    8. A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
    9. Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
    10. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Harrington & John M. Vernon, 2005. "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 4, volume 1, number 026222075x, December.
    11. Kou, Zonglai & Zhou, Min, 2015. "Hotelling’s competition with relative performance evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 69-71.
    12. Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe & Alexander Rasch, 2018. "Product Liability in Markets for Vertically Differentiated Products," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 46-81.
    13. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim & Grechenig, Kristoffel, 2011. "A note on the optimality of (even more) incomplete strict liability," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 77-82, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Langlais & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2022. "Incentives to differentiate under environmental liability laws : Product customization and precautionary effort," EconomiX Working Papers 2022-20, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Product liability; Product differentiation; Misperception of risk; Product safety;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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