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Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others

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  • Bruce Hay
  • Kathryn E. Spier

Abstract

Should the manufacturer of a product be held legally responsible when a consumer, while using the product, harms someone else? We show that if consumers have deep pockets, then manufacturer liability is not desirable. If homogeneous consumers have limited assets, then the best rule is "residual-manufacturer liability" where the manufacturer pays the shortfall in damages not paid by the consumer. Residual-manufacturer liability distorts the market quantity when consumers' willingness to pay is correlated with their propensity to cause harm. It distorts product safety when consumers differ in their wealth levels. In both cases, consumer-only liability may be preferred.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, 2005. "Manufacturer Liability for Harms Caused by Consumers to Others," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(5), pages 1700-1711, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:95:y:2005:i:5:p:1700-1711
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/000282805775014416
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yeon‐Koo Che & Kathryn E. Spier, 2008. "Strategic judgment proofing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(4), pages 926-948, December.
    2. Kort, Peter & Lavrutich, Maria & Nunes, Cláudia & Oliveira, Carlos, 2023. "Preventive investment, malfunctions and liability," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 263(C).
    3. Fu, Qiang & Gong, Jie & Png, I.P.L., 2018. "Law, social responsibility, and outsourcing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 114-146.
    4. Galasso, Alberto & Luo, Hong, 2018. "How does product liability risk affect innovation? Evidence from medical implants," CEPR Discussion Papers 13036, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Tim Friehe & Christoph Rößler & Xiaoge Dong, 2020. "Liability for Third-Party Harm When Harm-Inflicting Consumers Are Present Biased," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 22(1), pages 75-104.
    6. Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, 2018. "Punishing Robots: Issues in the Economics of Tort Liability and Innovation in Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda, pages 493-504, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2022. "The economics of platform liability," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 319-351, June.
    8. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2013. "Economic analysis of products liability: Theory," Chapters, in: Jennifer H. Arlen (ed.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Torts, chapter 3, pages 69-96, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2024. "Artificial intelligence, inattention and liability rules," Working Papers 2024-08, CRESE.
    10. Alberto Galasso & Hong Luo, 2018. "When does Product Liability Risk Chill Innovation? Evidence from Medical Implants," NBER Working Papers 25068, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Doh-Shin Jeon & Yassine Lefouili & Leonardo Madio, 2021. "Platform Liability and Innovation," Working Papers 21-05, NET Institute.
    12. Mitja Kovac & Salvini Datta & Rok Spruk, 2021. "Pharmaceutical Product Liability, Litigation Regimes, and the Propensity to Patent: An Empirical Firm-Level Investigation," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(2), pages 21582440211, April.
    13. Thomas J. Miceli & Rebecca Rabon & Kathleen Segerson, 2012. "Liability versus Regulation for Controlling Product-Related Risks," Working papers 2012-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    14. Langinier, Corinne & Marcoul, Philippe, 2009. "Contributory infringement rule and patents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 296-310, May.
    15. Alessandro De Chiara & Juan-José Ganuza & Fernando Gómez & Ester Manna & Adrián Segura, 2023. "Platform Liability with Reputational Sanctions," Working Papers 1403, Barcelona School of Economics.
    16. Eric Helland & Darius Lakdawalla & Anup Malani & Seth A Seabury, 2020. "Unintended Consequences of Products Liability: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market [“An Economic Analysis of Mary Carter Settlement Agreements,”]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(3), pages 598-632.
    17. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2022. "Advisory algorithms and liability rules," Working Papers hal-04222291, HAL.
    18. Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais & Elisabeth Schulte, 2022. "Firm Liability When Third Parties and Consumers Incur Cumulative Harm," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 81(1), pages 53-71, January.
    19. Tim Friehe & Christoph Rössler & Elisabeth Schulte, 2023. "Probing the case for manufacturer liability for harms caused by judgment-proof consumers to others," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 443-460, December.
    20. Galasso, Alberto & Luo, Hong, 2019. "Risk-Mitigating Technologies: the Case of Radiation Diagnostic Devices," CEPR Discussion Papers 13682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Christoph Rössler & Tim Friehe, 2020. "Liability, morality, and image concerns in product accidents with third parties," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 50(2), pages 295-312, October.
    22. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Suo Wang, 2015. "Products Liability When Consumers Vary In Their Susceptibility To Harm And May Misperceive Risk," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 33(3), pages 468-476, July.
    23. Bhole, Bharat & Wagner, Jeffrey, 2008. "The joint use of regulation and strict liability with multidimensional care and uncertain conviction," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 123-132, June.
    24. Dawid, Herbert & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2022. "Smart products: Liability, investments in product safety, and the timing of market introduction," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    25. Marie Obidzinski & Yves Oytana, 2022. "Prediction, human decision and liability rules, CRED Working paper No 2022-06," Working Papers hal-04034871, HAL.

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