Economic Analysis of Products Liability: Theory
AbstractThis chapter provides a survey of much of the recent theoretical analysis of products liability. We start by describing an idealized model and providing the specific economic assumptions which underpin it. Later sections examine the effects of relaxing these assumptions, which has been the focus of much of the theoretical work over the last few decades. These modifications include: informational differences between producers and consumers that arise over the life of a product; incorporation of endogenously-determined costs, such as those that arise from investment in care; and evaluating contractual versus mandatory liability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1107.
Date of creation: Jun 2011
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Products Liability; Safety; Contractural Liability; Strict Liability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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