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On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action

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  • Jiao, Zhenhua
  • Shen, Ziyang

Abstract

In school choice, priority-based affirmative action favors minority students by means of promoting their priority ranking at schools. This paper investigates the responsiveness of the top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action when schools’ priority structure satisfies a certain acyclicity condition. When schools’ priority under the problem without affirmative action satisfies virtual homogeneity condition, a weak responsiveness result is obtained.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiao, Zhenhua & Shen, Ziyang, 2020. "On responsiveness of top trading cycles mechanism to priority-based affirmative action," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:186:y:2020:i:c:s0165176519302678
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108545
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Top trading cycles mechanism; Affirmative action; Responsiveness; Virtual homogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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