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The welfare costs of bank regulation by deposit rate ceilings

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  • Nielsen, Carsten
  • Weinrich, Gerd

Abstract

In a transparent and parsimonious moral hazard setting, various types of inefficiencies of deposit rate ceilings are identified. Welfare with ceilings may be lower than welfare without these and a more risky environment may render deposit rate ceilings impotent.

Suggested Citation

  • Nielsen, Carsten & Weinrich, Gerd, 2019. "The welfare costs of bank regulation by deposit rate ceilings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 33-37.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:179:y:2019:i:c:p:33-37
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.03.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Repullo, Rafael, 2004. "Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 156-182, April.
    2. Carsten Krabbe Nielsen & Gerd Weinrich, 2018. "Bank regulation when both deposit rate control and capital requirements are socially costly," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 14(2), pages 139-178, June.
    3. R. Alton Gilbert, 1986. "Requiem for Regulation Q: what it did and why it passed away," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Feb, pages 22-37.
    4. Kevin C. Murdock & Thomas F. Hellmann & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 147-165, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:ptu:bdpart:r202011 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Paulo Esteves & Maximiano Pinheiro, 2020. "Deposit interest rate ceilings," Economic Bulletin and Financial Stability Report Articles and Banco de Portugal Economic Studies, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    3. Eccles, Peter & Grout, Paul & Zalewska, Anna & Siciliani, Paolo, 2023. "Open banking, shadow banking and regulation," Bank of England working papers 1039, Bank of England.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank regulation; Moral hazard; Deposit rate ceilings; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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