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Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice

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  • Jiao, Zhenhua
  • Tian, Guoqiang

Abstract

This paper investigates the responsiveness of priority-based affirmative action in school choice. We consider two efficiency-improved mechanisms—Kesten’s EADAM (efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism) and DA-TTC mechanism (running deferred acceptance and then running top trading cycles algorithm). We show that neither EADAM nor DA-TTC is minimally responsive to the priority-based affirmative action policy. That is, under EADAM or DA-TTC, there are market situations in which a stronger affirmative action policy may result in a Pareto inferior assignment for the minority students.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiao, Zhenhua & Tian, Guoqiang, 2018. "Two further impossibility results on responsive affirmative action in school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 60-62.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:166:y:2018:i:c:p:60-62
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.02.020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ehlers, Lars & Hafalir, Isa E. & Yenmez, M. Bumin & Yildirim, Muhammed A., 2014. "School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 648-683.
    2. Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz & Salman, Umutcan, 2016. "Affirmative actions: The Boston mechanism case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 95-97.
    3. Ju, Yan & Lin, Deguang & Wang, Dazhong, 2018. "Affirmative action in school choice: A new solution," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 1-9.
    4. Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
    5. , Emin & , Bumin & , Ali, 2013. "Effective affirmative action in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(2), May.
    6. Tang, Qianfeng & Yu, Jingsheng, 2014. "A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 543-561.
    7. Kojima, Fuhito, 2012. "School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 685-693.
    8. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    9. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
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    Cited by:

    1. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "School Choice with Multiple Priorities," Papers 2308.04780, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.
    2. Jiao, Zhenhua & Shen, Ziyang, 2021. "School choice with priority-based affirmative action: A responsive solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 1-9.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    School choice; Affirmative action; Minimal responsiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

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