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Delinquency model predictive power among low-documentation loans

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  • Jiang, Wei
  • Nelson, Ashlyn Aiko
  • Vytlacil, Edward

Abstract

Using data from a major mortgage bank, we examine the predictive power of mortgage delinquency models as an aggregate measure of the quality of information recorded at loan origination. We measure model predictive power using an out-of-sample prediction criterion and compare predictive power of delinquency models over time and across loans of different documentation levels and origination channels. We found that model predictive power declined over time throughout the housing boom; further, predictive power is attenuated in delinquency models for low-documentation loans, providing suggestive evidence that loan and borrower characteristics used in the delinquency predictions may be inaccurate or falsified for such loans. We do not find differences in model predictive power when comparing bank- versus third party (broker) originated loans.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiang, Wei & Nelson, Ashlyn Aiko & Vytlacil, Edward, 2013. "Delinquency model predictive power among low-documentation loans," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 171-173.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:171-173
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.046
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Piskorski, Tomasz & Seru, Amit & Vig, Vikrant, 2010. "Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 369-397, September.
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    2. McQuinn, Kieran & O’Toole, Conor & Slaymaker, Rachel, 2021. "Credit access, macroprudential rules and policy interventions: Lessons for potential first time buyers," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 944-963.
    3. Slaymaker, Rachel & O'Toole, Conor & McQuinn, Kieran & Fahy, Mike, 2018. "Monetary policy normalisation and mortgage arrears in a recovering economy: The case of the Irish residential market," Papers WP613, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
    4. Dror Parnes, 2023. "Typical States and Their Risks for Mortgage Loans," Journal of Quantitative Economics, Springer;The Indian Econometric Society (TIES), vol. 21(2), pages 395-415, June.
    5. David Byrne & Robert Kelly & Conor O'Toole, 2022. "How Does Monetary Policy Pass‐Through Affect Mortgage Default? Evidence from the Irish Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(7), pages 2081-2101, October.
    6. Corrigan, Eoin & O'Toole, Conor & Slaymaker, 2020. "Credit demand in the Irish mortgage market: What is the gap and could public lending help?," Papers WP671, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).

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