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Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership

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  • Aronsson, Thomas
  • Persson, Lars
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    Abstract

    This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016517651200256X
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 223-226

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:223-226

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

    Related research

    Keywords: Optimal taxation; Redistribution; Public goods; Fiscal federalism; Decentralized leadership; Horizontal leadership;

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    1. Stern, Nicholas, 1982. "Optimum taxation with errors in administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 181-211, March.
    2. Robin Boadway & Michael Keen, 1991. "Public Goods, Self-Selection and Optimal Income Taxation," Working Papers 828, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    3. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July.
    4. Aronsson, Thomas, 2010. "Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 187-195, July.
    5. Aronsson, Thomas & Jonsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Environmental Policy and Optimal Taxation in a Decentralized Economic Federation," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 669, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    6. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    7. Silva, Emilson C. D. & Caplan, Arthur J., 1997. "Transboundary Pollution Control in Federal Systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 173-186, October.
    8. Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
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