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On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets

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  • Kind, Hans Jarle
  • Koethenbuerger, Marko
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm

Abstract

A benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 104 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 86-88

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:104:y:2009:i:2:p:86-88

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: Ad valorem taxes Unit taxes Two-sided markets Revenue-dominance Welfare-dominance Monopoly;

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References

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  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Triole, 2002. "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group dp409, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Hans Jarle Kind & Marko Köthenbürger & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2008. "Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 2262, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:645-667 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Evans David S., 2003. "Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 2(3), pages 1-19, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Aiura, Hiroshi & Ogawa, Hikaru, 2013. "Unit tax versus ad valorem tax: A tax competition model with cross-border shopping," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 30-38.
  2. Laszlo Goerke & Frederik Herzberg & Thorsten Upmann, 2012. "Failure of Ad Valorem and Specific Tax Equivalence under Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series 3946, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Laszlo Goerke, 2011. "Commodity Tax Structure under Uncertainty in a Perfectly Competitive Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 3339, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Laszlo Goerke, 2012. "The Optimal Structure of Commodity Taxation in a Monopoly with Tax Avoidance or Evasion," Public Finance Review, , vol. 40(4), pages 519-536, July.

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