On revenue and welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes in two-sided markets
AbstractA benchmark result in public economics is that it is possible to increase both tax revenue and welfare by making a monopoly subject to ad valorem taxes rather than unit taxes. We show that such revenue and welfare dominance does not hold in two-sided markets.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 104 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Ad valorem taxes Unit taxes Two-sided markets Revenue-dominance Welfare-dominance Monopoly;
Other versions of this item:
- Kind, Hans Jarle & Koethenbuerger, Marko & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2009. "On Revenue and Welfare Dominance of Ad Valorem Taxes in Two-Sided Markets," Discussion Papers, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics 2009/9, Department of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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