Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry
AbstractWe study how deregulation of corporate law affects the decision of entrepreneurs of where to incorporate. Recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have enabled entrepreneurs to select their country of incorporation independently of their real seat. We analyze foreign incorporations in the U.K., where incorporations of limited liability companies can be arranged at low cost. Using data for over 2 million companies from around the world incorporating in the U.K., we find a large increase in cross-country incorporations from E.U. Member States following the ECJ rulings. In line with regulatory cost theories, incorporations are primarily driven by minimum capital requirements and setup costs in home countries. We record widespread use of special incorporation agents to facilitate legal mobility across countries.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Corporate Finance.
Volume (Year): 14 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin
Other versions of this item:
- Marco Becht & Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, 2008. "Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13306, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Marco Becht & Colin Mayer & Hannes F. Wagner, 2008. "Where do firms incorporate? Deregulation and the cost of entry," OFRC Working Papers Series 2008fe04, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
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