Heterogeneous aspiration resolves social dilemma in structured populations

In this paper, we study the impact of heterogeneous aspiration-driven strategy update rules on the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game. Individuals on network are divided into two categories: one part is the traditional players who update their strategies by imitating their neighbors’ strategies, the remaining of the individuals update their strategies based on heterogeneous aspiration. In the latter case, the probability of aspiration-driven updating is closely related to the payoffs of neighbors. Through Monte Carlo simulation, it found that heterogeneous aspiration can efficiently promote the network reciprocity. From the micro perspective, we find that such a mechanism can reserve the classical spatial distribution of cooperators, where cooperator clusters will be exploited by defectors. Based on the classical distribution, the strategies transitions show the essential reason for promotion of cooperation. In order to verify the generality of the conclusion, we further introduce the proposed mechanism into the snowdrift game and the public goods game, and obtain the observations consistent with the prisoner's dilemma game.