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Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation

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  • Gao, Shiping
  • Li, Nan

Abstract

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has garnered increasing interest in a variety of fields, yet the majority of existing models assume that individuals’ preferences are fixed and stable. Preference reversal, a systematic disparity between people’s valuations and choices, implies that individuals’ preferences are inherently unstable and changing. To better understand how cooperation evolves, we develop a simple model with preference reversal in the context of the public goods game, in which the decision on whether and how to punish defectors is heavily influenced by the cooperators’ preference for punishment in two decision-making processes. We explore the effects of preference reversal on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in infinitely well-mixed populations. We also specify the scenarios where preference reversal favors cooperation. The chance of preference reversal as well as the predisposing conditions for preference reversal are critical in determining whether preference reversal facilitates the emergence of cooperation.

Suggested Citation

  • Gao, Shiping & Li, Nan, 2023. "Preference reversal and the evolution of cooperation," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:apmaco:v:438:y:2023:i:c:s0096300322006415
    DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127567
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    References listed on IDEAS

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