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The Investigation and Elimination of Public Procurement Fraud in Government Sectors (A Case Study in Indonesia's Procurement System: Cases from 2006 to 2012)

Author

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  • Ach Maulidi

    (Sheffield Hallam University, United Kingdom.)

Abstract

This paper offers insights to enhance our understanding of public procurement fraud through analyzing current 173 cases during 2006 to 2012 in Indonesia's procurement system using various points of view. These insights are synthesized from current research findings and contemporary thinking elaborated by practical knowledge and skills, the aim of which is to produce accurate analysis. The main aim of this paper is to participate in terms of combating procurement fraud by suggesting plausible and applicable measures in relation to investigating and preventing this kind of financial crime, and in terms of developing theory. The result of this study confirms that detection and deterrence of public procurement fraud are still longstanding antirust problems, made difficult because collusive arrangements among bidders, between contractors and employers, and sole procurement committees are usually surreptitious. Because of complex and confusing procurement mechanisms with blurred and overlapping jurisdictions, information asymmetry and conflict of interest, the corrupt behaviors is likely to continue to flourish. This study reveals that cooperation between government and private sector to maintain high standards of integrity is viewed the most effective aspect that should be taken into account prudently when designing precaution measures for procurement fraud.

Suggested Citation

  • Ach Maulidi, 2017. "The Investigation and Elimination of Public Procurement Fraud in Government Sectors (A Case Study in Indonesia's Procurement System: Cases from 2006 to 2012)," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(2), pages 145-154.
  • Handle: RePEc:eco:journ1:2017-02-20
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Akintola Akintoye & Eamon Fitzgerald, 2000. "A survey of current cost estimating practices in the UK," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 161-172.
    2. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nuswantara Dian Anita & Maulidi Ach & Pujiono, 2017. "The efficacy of control environment as fraud deterrence in local government," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 12(4), pages 591-613, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fraud; Public Procurement; Investigating; Preventing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing

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