Der KMD-Kartellcheck: Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen am Beispiel des deutschen Zementmarkts
AbstractCoordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently. The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies inot additional more detailed audits. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center of Applied Economic Research Münster (CAWM), University of Münster in its series Beiträge zur angewandten Wirtschaftsforschung with number 11.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
cartel; collusion; price fixing; collusive marker; cartel audit; market screening; cement; CFD;
Other versions of this item:
- Christian Lorenz, . "Der KMD-Kartellcheck - Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen am Beispiel des deutschen Zementmarkts," Working Papers 201162, Institute of Spatial and Housing Economics, Munster Universitary.
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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- Ulrich Blum & Michael A. Veltins, 2005. "Die Identifikation des „Wirtschaftlichen Vorteils“ in Kartellverfahren," IWH Discussion Papers 1, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
- Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
- Veltins, Michael A. & Schaller, Armin & Blum, Ulrich, 2004. "The East German Cement Cartel : An Inquiry into Comparable Markets, Industry Structure, and Antitrust Policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/04, Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
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