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On a trade-off in the evolution of ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Miyashita Haruki

    (University of Tsukuba)

Abstract

This paper shows that the emergence of ownership faces a trade-off between interacting group size in a population and the fighting cost for resources in a Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game played by entities in the population. More precisely, for each fighting cost, large size of the group induces neutral stability of the Bourgeois whereas small size ensures evolutionary stability of the Hawk. Each player's adaption process is supposed as follows : At each period, a sub-group of the population is randomly drawn, and the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game is played in the group. Each player in a group observes the payoff distribution of the members in the group and switches own strategy to one with higher payoff.

Suggested Citation

  • Miyashita Haruki, 2018. "On a trade-off in the evolution of ownership," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1257-1260.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-18-00528
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2018/Volume38/EB-18-V38-I3-P120.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game; Evolutionary dynamics; Local matching structure; NSS; ESS;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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