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Fixed-fee Pricing and Entry

Author

Listed:
  • Ryoko Oki

    (College of Commerce, Nihon University)

Abstract

This study considers the anti-competitive effect of fixed-fee pricing, such as the one seen in a recent antitrust case in Japan. We show that fixed-fee pricing has stronger exclusionary effect than the per-use pricing's exclusionary effect. However, the restriction on usage of fixed-fee pricing may have a welfare-decreasing effect, although the restriction promotes entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryoko Oki, 2015. "Fixed-fee Pricing and Entry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(1), pages 233-240.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-14-00684
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2015/Volume35/EB-15-V35-I1-P26.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fixed-fee pricing; Antitrust policy;

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

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