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Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?

Author

Listed:
  • Gershkov, Alex

    (Department of Economics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem & University of Surrey)

  • Moldovanu, Benny

    (Department of Economics, Bonn University)

  • Shi, Xianwen

    (Department of Economics, University of Toronto)

Abstract

We study a multi-dimensional collective decision under incomplete information. Agents have Euclidean preferences and vote by simple majority on each issue (dimension), yielding the coordinate-wise median. Judicious rotations of the orthogonal axes -- the issues that are voted upon -- lead to welfare improvements. If the agents' types are drawn from a distribution with independent marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals are identical (but not necessarily independent), then voting first on the total sum and next on the differences is often welfare superior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on incentive efficiency: in particular, if agents' types are drawn from a log-concave density with I.I.D. marginals, a second-best voting mechanism attains at least 88% of the first-best efficiency. Finally, we generalize our method and some of our insights to preferences derived from distance functions based on inner products.

Suggested Citation

  • Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2019. "Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:3193
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2017. "Optimal Voting Rules," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(2), pages 688-717.
    2. Yannis Bakos & Erik Brynjolfsson, 1999. "Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 45(12), pages 1613-1630, December.
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    7. Kaas, R. & Dhaene, J. & Vyncke, D. & Goovaerts, M.J. & Denuit, M., 2002. "A Simple Geometric Proof that Comonotonic Risks Have the Convex-Largest Sum," ASTIN Bulletin, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(1), pages 71-80, May.
    8. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan & Michael D. Whinston, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 371-383.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Agenda-manipulation in ranking," Papers 2001.11341, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    2. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2023. "Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 11-34, July.
    4. Tobias Rachidi, 2020. "Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_214, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    5. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny & Shi, Xianwen, 2020. "Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multi-dimensional voting; rotation; budgeting procedure; mechanism design;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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