Finanzierungs- und Governance-Strukturen im Wandel: Arbeitsteilung zwischen Banken und Private Equity Fonds
Abstract
Die Strukturen der Unternehmensfinanzierung und -kontrolle haben sich weltweit grundlegend verändert, gekennzeichnet durch neue Kapitalmarktinstrumente, verstärktes Auftreten von Nichtbank-Finanzintermediären sowie zunehmende Arbeitsteilung zwischen den Marktteilnehmern. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, ob dadurch Beziehungsfinanzierung durch Transaktionsfinanzierung ersetzt wird und welche Rolle Private Equity Fonds (insbesondere Buyout und Venture Capital Fonds) im Vergleich zu Banken bei der Bereitstellung enger Finanzierungsbeziehungen übernehmen. Mithilfe der Governance-Struktur-Theorie der Transaktionskostenökonomik wird gezeigt, dass Relationship Banking (Private Debt) und Relationship Investing (Private Equity) hybride Organisationsformen zwischen Markt und Hierarchie darstellen, wobei Private Equity hierarchischer ist als Private Debt. Beide Formen der Beziehungsfinanzierung ergänzen sich zur Finanzierung von Investitionsprojekten unterschiedlicher Spezifität. Die zunehmende Arbeitsteilung zwischen ihnen ist produktiv, beinhaltet aber zunehmende Risiken für die Stabilität des Finanzsystems, die in der aktuellen Krise zutage getreten sind. The structures of entrepreneurial finance and control have changed profoundly worldwide, given by new capital market instruments, a growing role of nonbank financial intermediaries, and an increasing division of labor among market participants. The present paper discusses whether this implies a substitution of relationship finance by transaction finance and which role private equity funds (especially buyout and venture capital funds) take in the provision of close financing relationships compared to banks. Using the governance structure theory of transaction cost economics, we show that relationship banking (private debt) und relationship investing (private equity) are hybrid governance forms between market and hierarchy, with private equity being more hierarchical than private debt. Both kinds of relationship finance are complements to finance investment projects with different asset specificity. The growing division of labor between them is productive, but involves growing risks for the stability of the financial system, which became evident in the actual financial crisis.Download Info
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Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung.
Volume (Year): 78 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 143-155
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Related research
Keywords: Corporate governance; corporate finance; financial intermediation; relationship banking; private equity;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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