IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/diw/diwvjh/73-30-12.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Simple Proposal for a "Debt-Sensitive Stability Pact"

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco Saraceno
  • Paola Monperrus-Veroni

Abstract

The main rationale for fiscal policy rules is the concern for long-term sustainability of public finances, that in a monetary union may affect the other members. Among many other criticisms, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been seen as contradictory or incomplete because it focuses on deficit rather than debt, the main indicator of public finances' soundness. Furthermore, the few references to debt that were present in the treaties and related regulations are essentially ignored in actual practices. Some of the reform proposals that came out lately have addressed the issue and tried to embed a debt criterion in the Pact. We review these proposals and put forward our own proposed modification: the deficit ratio countries should target is weighted by their relative debt. With respect to the other proposals taking into account debt, our own has the advantages of simplicity, symmetry, and low arbitrariness. To make it politically acceptable to high debt countries, nevertheless, could require to set the targets, at least initially, at level higher than the Maastricht criteria. Das Hauptargument für fiskalpolitische Regeln ist die Berücksichtigung der langfristigen Nachhaltigkeit der öffentlichen Finanzen, die in einer Währungsunion andere Mitgliedstaaten berührt. Neben anderen Punkten wird am Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt (SWP) kritisiert, dass er widersprüchlich oder unvollkommen sei, da der Fokus auf dem Defizitkriterium liegt und nicht auf dem Schuldenstand. Die in den Verträgen zu findenden wenigen Verweise auf den Schuldenstand werden praktisch ignoriert. Einige spät veröffentlichte Reformverschläge tragen allerdings dem Schuldenstandskriterium Rechnung und versuchen, dies in den SWP aufzunehmen. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird vorgeschlagen, das Defizitkriterium mit dem Schuldenstand zu gewichten. Der Vorschlag ist einfach, symmetrisch und nicht arbiträr. Um den Vorschlag für Länder mit hohem Schuldenstand attraktiv zu machen, müssten zumindest zu Beginn die Ziele für sie über dem Maastricht-Kriterium liegen dürfen.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco Saraceno & Paola Monperrus-Veroni, 2004. "A Simple Proposal for a "Debt-Sensitive Stability Pact"," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 471-480.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-12
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.73.3.471
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.73.3.471
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3790/vjh.73.3.471?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buti, Marco, 2003. "Revisiting the stability and growth pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 34908, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    2. Blanchard, Olivier & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2004. "Improving the SGP Through a Proper Accounting of Public Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4220, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 180, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    4. Peter S. Heller & Sanjeev Gupta, 2002. "More Aid - Making It Work for the Poor," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 3(4), pages 131-146, October.
    5. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Devereux, Michael P. & Guiso, Luigi & Hassler, John & Saint-Paul, Gilles & Sinn, Hans-Werner & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vives, Xavier, 2010. "The European economy," Munich Reprints in Economics 20104, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Mr. George Kopits & Mr. Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 1998/011, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Saraceno & Paola Veroni, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance," Sciences Po publications 2005-1, Sciences Po.
    2. Francesco Saraceno & Paola Veroni, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance," Working Papers hal-03462247, HAL.
    3. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Francesco Saraceno & Paola Veroni, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03462247, HAL.
    6. Menguy, Séverine, 2008. "A dynamic rule applied to the threshold imposed on the European budgetary deficits," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 1093-1105.
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Adam Geršl & Martina Jašová & Jan Zápal, 2014. "Fiscal Councils and Economic Volatility," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(3), pages 190-212, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Paola Monperrus-Veroni & Francesco Saraceno, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance?," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2005-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Francesco Saraceno & Paola Veroni, 2004. "A Simple Proposal for a Debt Related Fiscal Rule," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/2524, Sciences Po.
    4. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2524 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Szapáry, György & Orbán, Gábor, 2004. "A stabilitási és növekedési paktum az új tagállamok szemszögéből [The Stabilization and Growth Pact in the light of the new EU member-states]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 810-831.
    6. Catherine Mathieu & Henri Sterdyniak, 2003. "Reforming the Stability and Growth Pact: Breaking the Ice," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-00972861, HAL.
    7. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Orban, Gabor & Szapary, Gyorgy, 2004. "The Stability and Growth Pact from the perspective of the new member states," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 26(7), pages 839-864, October.
    9. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2842 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Groneck, Max, 2010. "A golden rule of public finance or a fixed deficit regime?: Growth and welfare effects of budget rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 523-534, March.
    11. Francesco Saraceno & Paola Veroni, 2005. "Reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: Reducing or Increasing the Nuisance," Working Papers hal-03462247, HAL.
    12. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/2524 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/2524 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Groneck, Max, 2008. "A Golden Rule of Public Finance or a Fixed Deficit Regime? Growth and Welfare Effects of Budget Rules," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 08-7, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
    15. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/1933 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Damir Šehović, 2015. "Analysis of Fiscal Rules in the European Monetary Union," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 4(1), pages 19-33.
    17. Truger, Achim & Hein, Eckhard, 2004. "Macroeconomic co-ordination as an economic policy concept : opportunities and obstacles in the EMU," WSI Working Papers 125, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    18. Pierre Richard Agénor & Devrim Yilmaz, 2006. "The Tyranny of Rules: Fiscal Discipline, Productive Spending, and Growth," Economics Discussion Paper Series 0616, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    19. Muscatelli, Vito A. & Natale, Piergiovanna & Tirelli, Patrizio, 2012. "A simple and flexible alternative to Stability and Growth Pact deficit ceilings. Is it at hand?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 14-26.
    20. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco & Stefania Zotteri, 2006. "EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?," Empirica, Springer;Austrian Institute for Economic Research;Austrian Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 63-87, June.
    21. Hideaki Tanaka, 2005. "Fiscal Rules and Targets and Public Expenditure Management: Enthusiasm in the 1990's and its Aftermath," Asia Pacific Economic Papers 346, Australia-Japan Research Centre, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    22. Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2005. "In Praise of Fiscal Restraint and Debt Rules. What the Euro Zone Might Do Now," CEPR Discussion Papers 5043, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Poplawski Ribeiro, Marcos & Beetsma, Roel, 2008. "The political economy of structural reforms under a deficit restriction," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 179-198, March.
    24. Pina, Alvaro Manuel & St. Aubyn, Miguel, 2005. "Comparing macroeconomic returns on human and public capital: An empirical analysis of the Portuguese case (1960-2001)," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 585-598, July.
    25. Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2006. "An experimental analysis of voting in the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Monetary Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 417-434, December.
    26. Alessandro Girardi & Paolo Paesani, 2008. "Structural Reforms and Fiscal Discipline in Europe," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 15(2), pages 389-402, September.
    27. Carlo Panico & Francesco Purificato, 2012. "The Role of Institutional and Political Factors in the European Debt Crisis," Working Papers wp280, Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:73-30-12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bibliothek (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/diwbede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.