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Concentration de propriété et investissements en R&D:une perspective d’agence

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  • Jackie Di Vito

    ()
    (HEC Montréal)

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    Abstract

    (VF)Cette revue de littérature vise à comprendre la relation entre les structures de propriété et les décisions d’investissement en R&D. En analysant la littérature scientifique qui s’est intéressée à cette problématique, nous constatons que la relation entre les structures de propriété et la R&D diffère selon le contexte économique étudié. Ces différences observées d’une économie à l’autre s’expliquent par la prédominance de différents types de conflits d’agence spécifiques à chacune d’elles. Nous discutons des limites de la littérature existante en proposant des pistes de recherches intéressantes pour enrichir la littérature étudiant la relation entre la concentration de propriété et les investissements en R&D.(VA)This literature review seeks to understand the relationship between corporate ownership structures and R&D investments. When examining the findings gathered from different economies throughout different parts of the world, we observe important differrences in the effect of ownership structures on R&D investments from one economic context to another. These differences are based on specific differences in the agency conflicts that are predominant in the different economic settings. We underline and discuss some of the limitations in the present literature and provide several suggestions for future research to improve our understand-ding of the relationship between ownership concentration and R&D investments.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by revues.org in its journal Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie.

    Volume (Year): 14 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (June)
    Pages: 67-100

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    Handle: RePEc:dij:revfcs:v:14:y:2011:i:q2:p:67-100

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    Related research

    Keywords: Structures de propriété; R&D; structures à contrôle minoritaire; théorie de l’agence; enracinement; corporate ownership structures; R&D; controlling- Minority Structures; agency theory; entrenchment.;

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