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The Canadian and American Financial Systems: Competition and Regulation

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  • Cécile Carpentier
  • Jean-Marc Suret

Abstract

Centralization of securities regulation in Canada is a recurring topic which was recently given new impetus. Various participants suggest that the American model is an example of regulatory centralization and could be transposed to Canada. Our study shows the enormous differences which separate these two systems. The SEC may be considered a regulatory monopoly with respect to important securities, in the face of a competitive and fragmented industry. In Canada, provincial securities regulation creates a form of regulatory competition in the face of a very heavily concentrated industry. Consequently, the American regulatory framework is not transferable to Canada, and the risks of significant influence by the industry on the regulatory framework or even regulatory capture are high in Canada.

Suggested Citation

  • Cécile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, 2003. "The Canadian and American Financial Systems: Competition and Regulation," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 29(4), pages 431-447, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:29:y:2003:i:4:p:431-447
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    8. repec:aei:rpbook:53576 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 2000. "Obstacles to Optimal Policy: The Interplay of Politics and Economics in Shaping Bank Supervision and Regulation Reforms," CRSP working papers 512, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cécile Carpentier & Jean-François L'Her & Jean-Marc Suret, 2005. "The Costs of Issuing Private Versus Public Equity," CIRANO Working Papers 2005s-14, CIRANO.

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