The Norwegian experiences of the past thirty years illustrate what we believe are two general tendencies in bank regulation. The first one is that a bank crisis will tend to focus regulators' minds and lead to stricter regulations. The second one is that cycles in regulation tend to interact with the economic cycle, in the sense that the rationale for strong regulation tends to become somewhat blurred when the economy is booming. These patterns appear in the Norwegian experience after the banking crisis of 1988-92, and they can presumably also be recognized in many other jurisdictions.
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Paper provided by Norges Bank in its series Working Paper with number
2009/18.
Find related papers by JEL classification: G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-
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