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Editor’s Introduction: The Promise and Peril of Ranked Choice Voting

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  • Caroline J. Tolbert

    (Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, USA)

  • Daria Kuznetsova

    (Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, USA)

Abstract

Dissatisfaction with two-party politics is at an all-time high in the US. As extreme polarization and minority rule persist, a possibility of an electoral reform becomes increasingly more likely. This editor’s introduction discusses the ranked choice voting (RCV) as an alternative to the current single-member geographic districts with winner-take-all plurality elections in the US. The articles for this thematic issue critically evaluate whether RCV lives up to its promise in improving democracy in the US. Like any rule or institutional change, it has benefits and drawbacks. The empirical and historical research presented here focuses on the implementation and use of RCV in the US compared to other countries. This thematic issue offers new insights into the promise and perils of RCV as a way to aggregate votes in elections that ensure that the winning candidate receives a majority of the votes cast.

Suggested Citation

  • Caroline J. Tolbert & Daria Kuznetsova, 2021. "Editor’s Introduction: The Promise and Peril of Ranked Choice Voting," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 265-270.
    • Handle: RePEc:cog:poango:v:9:y:2021:i:2:p:265-270
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Carles Boix, 1999. "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies," Economics Working Papers 367, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    2. Jack Santucci, 2021. "Variants of Ranked-Choice Voting from a Strategic Perspective," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 344-353.
    3. Courtney L. Juelich & Joseph A. Coll, 2021. "Ranked Choice Voting and Youth Voter Turnout: The Roles of Campaign Civility and Candidate Contact," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 319-331.
    4. Benjamin Reilly, 2021. "Ranked Choice Voting in Australia and America: Do Voters Follow Party Cues?," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 271-279.
    5. J. S. Maloy & Matthew Ward, 2021. "The Impact of Input Rules and Ballot Options on Voting Error: An Experimental Analysis," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 306-318.
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    9. Rob Richie & Benjamin Oestericher & Deb Otis & Jeremy Seitz-Brown, 2021. "Lessons from the Use of Ranked Choice Voting in American Presidential Primaries," Politics and Governance, Cogitatio Press, vol. 9(2), pages 354-364.
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