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Academics and Election Administration in Nigeria

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  • Jeremiah O. Arowosegbe

Abstract

Democratization has proceeded in Africa in terms of implementing multiparty democracy. However, there are still major challenges with this process across the continent. By examining the contribution of the intellectual to election administration in Africa vis‐à‐vis the political obligation of the citizen to the state, the knowledge of political science plays a significant role in resolving the challenges mitigating against democratic consolidation in the continent. This article interrogates the responsibilities of university academics in election administration from 1959 to 2019 and recounts the impact of such interventions for democratization and political stability in Nigeria. Our enquiry reveals that many of the problems undermining election administration are clearly beyond the interventions by these academics. The constraints and limitations of university academics in their efforts as instruments of large‐scale political change in Nigeria are connected largely with the fact that no institution or segment of the society is insulated from the power associated with politics in Nigeria. Accordingly, beyond election administration and also beyond the role of the intelligentsia therein, Nigeria's political ecology must undergo significant holistic changes to deliver a credible, fair and transparent electoral process. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremiah O. Arowosegbe, 2020. "Academics and Election Administration in Nigeria," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(7), pages 1009-1032, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:32:y:2020:i:7:p:1009-1032
    DOI: 10.1002/jid.3506
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    References listed on IDEAS

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