Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Promotions and Incentives in Partnerships: Evidence from Major U.S. Law Firms

Contents:

Author Info

  • Christopher Ferrall

Abstract

This paper develops a model of promotions in partnerships and estimates the model using cross-sectional data on major U.S. law firms. Promotions to partner screen associates for firm-specific skills and they generate tournament incentives among associates competing for promotions. The key parameters of the model are estimated by imposing the equilibrium restriction that firms offer equal utility to incoming associates. The incentive component of compensation is found to be statistically significant and a nested model without promotion incentives is rejected by the data.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199611%2929%3A4%3C811%3APAIIPE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 811-27

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:29:y:1996:i:4:p:811-27

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
Email:
Web page: http://economics.ca/cje/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://economics.ca/en/membership.php

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vukina, Tomislav & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2008. "Homogenous and Heterogenous Contestants in Piece Rate Tournaments: Theory and Empirical Analysis," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) 6540, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  2. Vandegrift, Donald & Brown, Paul, 2005. "Gender differences in the use of high-variance strategies in tournament competition," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 834-849, December.
  3. Duran, Mihael, 2011. "Nachträgliche Reduktion von Vorstandsbezügen: Eine ökonomische Analyse der Herabsetzungsmöglichkeit von Vorstandsbezügen nach dem VorstAG," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 332, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
  4. Bardsley, P., 2001. "Recursive Contracts," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 797, The University of Melbourne.
  5. Chen, Jiawei & Shum, Matthew, 2010. "Estimating a tournament model of intra-firm wage differentials," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 155(1), pages 39-55, March.
  6. Frijters, Paul, 2000. "The sale of relational capital through tenure profiles and tournaments," Labour Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 373-384, July.
  7. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Peter Bardsley & Nisvan Erkal & Nikos Nikiforakis & Tom Wilkening, 2011. "Recursive Contracts, Firm Longevity, and Rat Races: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 1122, The University of Melbourne, revised 2011.
  9. Bardsley, P. & Sherstyuk, K., 2001. "Rat Races and Glass Ceilings: Career Paths in Organizations," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 825, The University of Melbourne.
  10. Vandegrift, Donald & Yavas, Abdullah, 2009. "Men, women, and competition: An experimental test of behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 554-570, October.
  11. Donald Vandegrift & Abdullah Yavas & Paul Brown, 2007. "Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 345-368, December.
  12. Nuno Garoupa & Fernando Gómez, 2002. "Cashing by the hour: Why large law firms prefer hourly fees over contingent fees," Economics Working Papers 639, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  13. Michael Schwarz & Sergei Severinov, 2010. "Investment Tournaments: When Should a Rational Agent Put All Eggs in One Basket?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(4), pages 893-922, October.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:29:y:1996:i:4:p:811-27. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Prof. Werner Antweiler).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.