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The Closed-Loop Motive for Voluntary Export Restraints

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  • Engelbert J. Dockner
  • Alfred A. Haug

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints in a dynamic game model of duopolistic competition. It is shown that the imposition of a voluntary export restraint at the free-trade level of imports increases the market price and the profits of all firms in the industry if free trade is identified as the closed-loop (subgame-perfect) Cournot equilibrium of the game. Hence, the authors conclude that the predictions of static Cournot competition do not carry over to the dynamic case.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Canadian Economics Association in its journal Canadian Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 24 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 679-85

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Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:24:y:1991:i:3:p:679-85

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Postal: Canadian Economics Association Prof. Steven Ambler, Secretary-Treasurer c/o Olivier Lebert, CEA/CJE/CPP Office C.P. 35006, 1221 Fleury Est Montréal, Québec, Canada H2C 3K4
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Cited by:
  1. Benchekroun, Hassan, 2003. "Unilateral production restrictions in a dynamic duopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 214-239, August.
  2. G. Calzolari & L. Lambertini, 2001. "Export Restraints in a Model of Trade with Capital Accumulation," Working Papers 420, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  3. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2002. "A Differential Oligopoly Game with Differentiated Goods and Sticky Prices," Working Papers 440, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  4. Roberto Cellini & Luca Lambertini, 2006. "Workers’ enterprises are not perverse: differential oligopoly games with sticky price," Review of Economic Design, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 233-248, December.
  5. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2000. "Feedback and Open-Loop Solutions," Working Papers 393, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  6. Benchekroun, Hassan & Ray Chaudhuri, Amrita, 2014. "Transboundary pollution and clean technologies," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 601-619.

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