IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/rneart/v11y2012i3n4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Network Multipliers: The Optimality of Targeting Neighbors

Author

Listed:
  • Galeotti Andrea

    (University of Essex)

  • Goyal Sanjeev

    (University of Cambridge)

Abstract

A firm wishes to inform a community of individuals about its product. Information travels within the community because of the social interactions between individuals. We establish that social interactions appear in a firm's payoff as a network multiplier, which is increasing both in the mean and in the variance of the distribution of connections. We then show that the degree distribution of a neighbor first order dominates the degree distribution of a node; so a firm must pick the neighbor of a node rather than a node itself as the target of communication. The advantages of employing an indirect communication strategy are greater in more dispersed networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Galeotti Andrea & Goyal Sanjeev, 2012. "Network Multipliers: The Optimality of Targeting Neighbors," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-11, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:3:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1415
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1415
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1515/1446-9022.1415?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521857406.
    2. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2009. "Influencing the influencers: a theory of strategic diffusion," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(3), pages 509-532, September.
    3. Vega-Redondo,Fernando, 2007. "Complex Social Networks," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521674096.
    4. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kfir Eliaz & Ran Spiegler, 2020. "Incentive‐compatible advertising on nonretail platforms," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(2), pages 323-345, June.
    2. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2016. "Incentive Compatible Advertising on a Social Network," CEPR Discussion Papers 11223, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. James D. Campbell, 2015. "Localized price promotions as a quality signal in a publicly observable network," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 27-57, March.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lelarge, Marc, 2012. "Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 752-775.
    2. Dunia López-Pintado, 2017. "Influence networks and public goods," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 97-112, March.
    3. Andrea Galeotti & Brian W. Rogers, 2013. "Strategic Immunization and Group Structure," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 1-32, May.
    4. de Marti, Joan & Zenou, Yves, 2009. "Social Networks," Working Paper Series 816, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    5. Dunia Lopez-Pintado, 2016. "Influence networks and public goods," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2016-12, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron & Malekian, Azarakhsh & Ozdaglar, Asu, 2016. "Network security and contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 536-585.
    7. Jackson, Matthew O. & Zenou, Yves, 2015. "Games on Networks," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    8. Andrea Galeotti & Luca Paolo Merlino, 2014. "Endogenous Job Contact Networks," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55(4), pages 1201-1226, November.
    9. Galeotti, Andrea & Rogers, Brian W, 2012. "Strategic Immunization and Group Structure," Economics Discussion Papers 9978, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
    10. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru, 2015. "Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 100-127.
    11. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2014. "How to Defend a Network?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1450, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Dessí, Roberta & Gallo, Edoardo & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2016. "Network cognition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 78-96.
    13. Opolot, Daniel, 2012. "Social interactions and complex networks," MERIT Working Papers 2012-014, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    14. Italo Bischi, Gian & Lamantia, Fabio, 2012. "A dynamic model of oligopoly with R&D externalities along networks. Part II," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 66-82.
    15. , D. & Tessone, Claudio J. & ,, 2014. "Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(3), September.
    16. , David, 2016. "The formation of networks with local spillovers and limited observability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), September.
    17. Tomohiko Tomohiko, 2015. "Network Heterogeneity and a Coordination Game," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2462-2474.
    18. Dziubiński, Marcin Konrad & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "How do you defend a network?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    19. Nikolas Tsakas, 2014. "Optimal influence under observational learning," Gecomplexity Discussion Paper Series 4, Action IS1104 "The EU in the new complex geography of economic systems: models, tools and policy evaluation", revised Nov 2014.
    20. López-Pintado, Dunia, 2012. "Influence networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 776-787.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:3:n:4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.