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Why is Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed?

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  • Schmalensee Richard

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Bolt and Tieman (2008) suggested the prevalence of profit function non-concavity may account for the widespread use of skewed pricing by two-sided platform businesses. In both the Rochet-Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) models, however, skewed pricing may simply reflect substantial differences between side-specific demand functions; non-concavity is not necessary. In the Rochet-Tirole (2003) model, ubiquitous high pass-through rates, which seem implausible, are required for non-concavity to be prevalent. In the Armstrong (2006) model, non-concavity is not sufficient for skewed pricing. In both models, non-concavity is associated with strong indirect network effects; in the Armstrong (2006) model, such effects are also associated with dynamic instability.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmalensee Richard, 2011. "Why is Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(4), pages 1-13, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:10:y:2011:i:4:n:1
    DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1274
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schmalensee, Richard, 2002. "Payment Systems and Interchange Fees," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 103-122, June.
    2. Mark Armstrong, 2006. "Competition in two‐sided markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, September.
    3. Weyl, E. Glen, 2009. "Monopoly, Ramsey and Lindahl in Rochet and Tirole (2003)," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 99-100, May.
    4. Mark Armstrong Author-Email: mark.armstrong@ucl.ac.uk Author-Workplace-Name: University College of London, 2006. "Competition in Two-Sided Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 668-691, Autumn.
    5. Richard Schmalensee, 2002. "Payment Systems and Interchange Fees," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 103-122, June.
    6. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2004. "Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 423-447, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Soo Jin Kim & Pallavi Pal, 2021. "Quality Differentiation and Optimal Pricing Strategy in Multi-Sided Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 9267, CESifo.
    2. Andrei Hagiu & Daniel Spulber, 2013. "First-Party Content and Coordination in Two-Sided Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 933-949, April.
    3. Tavalaei, M. Mahdi, 2020. "Waiting time in two-sided platforms: The case of the airport industry," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    4. Emilio Calvano & Michele Polo, 2020. "Strategic Differentiation by Business Models: Free-To-Air and Pay-TV," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 130(625), pages 50-64.
    5. Daniel G. Arce, 2020. "Platform pricing redux," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 87(2), pages 732-740, October.
    6. David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, 2013. "The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses," NBER Working Papers 18783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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