Commodity Taxation under Habit Formation and Myopia
AbstractThis paper analyzes the pattern of consumption taxes in a two period model with habit formation and myopia. An individuals second-period needs increase with first period consumption. However, myopic individuals do not see this habit formation relation when they take their saving decision. The first-best solution is decentralized by a simple Pigouvian (paternalistic) consumption tax (along with suitable lump-sum taxes). In a second-best setting, when personalized lump-sum transfers are not available, consumption taxes may have conflicting paternalistic and redistributive effects. Taxes should discourage consumption of goods that entail negative externalities (unforeseen habits), but instead they discourage less the consumption of goods that are proportionately consumed by individuals with high net social marginal utility of income. Both myopic and farsighted individuals may benefit more from the second-best policy as the proportion of myopic agents in society increases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy.
Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
Other versions of this item:
- CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Commodity taxation under habit formation and myopia," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2244, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
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- Markus Haavio & Kaisa Kotakorpi, 2012.
"Sin Licenses Revisited,"
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4010, CESifo Group Munich.
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