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Does nepotism run in the family? CEO pay and pay‐performance sensitivity in Indian family firms

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  • Guoli Chen
  • Raveendra Chittoor
  • Balagopal Vissa

Abstract

Research Summary Using a principal–principal agency theory lens, we examine corporate governance and compensation design in family‐owned businesses. We conceptualize how CEO pay and pay‐performance sensitivity is influenced by whether the CEO is a professional or drawn from the controlling family (family CEO). Data from a sample of 277 publicly listed Indian family firms during 2004–2013 support our argument that family CEOs get paid more than professional CEOs. This pattern is stronger in superior‐performing firms that are named after the controlling family (eponymous firms). Furthermore, family CEOs of superior‐performing firms have higher pay‐performance sensitivity compared to professional CEOs of other superior‐performing firms. Our findings reveal nuanced heterogeneity in nepotism in emerging economy family firms—CEO compensation is a mechanism for some controlling families to tunnel corporate resources. Managerial Summary We examine whether CEO compensation and its responsiveness to realized firm performance in Indian family firms in influenced by whether the CEO is a professional or drawn from the controlling family (family CEO). Data from a sample of 277 publicly listed Indian family firms during 2004–2013 suggests family CEOs get paid more than professional CEOs. This pattern is stronger in superior‐performing firms that are named after the controlling family (eponymous firms). Furthermore, family CEOs' high compensation is unaffected by poor firm performance and is disproportionately boosted by superior firm performance. These results suggest that poor corporate governance allows some family controlled Indian firms to use CEO compensation as a mechanism to tunnel corporate resources in ways that hurt minority shareholders.

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  • Guoli Chen & Raveendra Chittoor & Balagopal Vissa, 2021. "Does nepotism run in the family? CEO pay and pay‐performance sensitivity in Indian family firms," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(7), pages 1326-1343, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:42:y:2021:i:7:p:1326-1343
    DOI: 10.1002/smj.3263
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    2. Sujata Banerjee & Alessandro Zattoni & Abrarali Saiyed, 2023. "Dominant-owner CEOs, board of directors and firm performance in emerging economies: Exploring the moderating impact of quad-qualified directors," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 40(4), pages 1607-1642, December.
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    5. Battisti, Enrico & Nirino, Niccolò & Leonidou, Erasmia & Salvi, Antonio, 2023. "Corporate social responsibility in family firms: Can corporate communication affect CSR performance?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
    6. Tomasz Ingram & Katarzyna Bratnicka-Mysliwiec, 2021. "Organizational Resilience and Family Firm Performance: The Role of Socioemotional Wealth," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(3), pages 523-540.
    7. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Ademola Obafemi Young & Xuan Vinh Vo & Mamdouh Abdulaziz Saleh Al‐Faryan, 2022. "Do institutional framework and its threshold matter in the sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance? Fresh insights from an emerging market economy," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3386-3403, December.
    8. Criaco, Giuseppe & van Oosterhout, J. (Hans) & Nordqvist, Mattias, 2021. "Is blood always thicker than water? Family firm parents, kinship ties, and the survival of spawns," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 36(6).
    9. D’Angelo, Valentino & Amore, Mario Daniele & Minichilli, Alessandro & Chen, Kelly Xing & Solarino, Angelo Maria, 2023. "Family agents," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2).

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