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Modeling Systems of Holding Back as Hypergames and their Connections with Systems Intelligence

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  • Yasuo Sasaki
  • Raimo P. Hämäläinen
  • Esa Saarinen

Abstract

We discuss linkages between hypergame theory and systems intelligence and examine how both perspectives can benefit one another. We argue that hypergame theory can provide a formal foundation for key premises of systems intelligence, whereas the philosophy of systems intelligence can present a new way to illustrate hypergame theory as a perspective in order for an agent acting inside a system to become systems intelligent. The integrated perspective elaborated here is particularly relevant in the context of certain kinds of paradoxical but ubiquitous human interactive situations called systems of holding back. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasuo Sasaki & Raimo P. Hämäläinen & Esa Saarinen, 2015. "Modeling Systems of Holding Back as Hypergames and their Connections with Systems Intelligence," Systems Research and Behavioral Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(6), pages 593-602, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:srbeha:v:32:y:2015:i:6:p:593-602
    DOI: 10.1002/sres.2276
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Yasuo Sasaki, 2017. "Generalized Nash equilibrium with stable belief hierarchies in static games with unawareness," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 256(2), pages 271-284, September.

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