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Performance voting, retrospective voting, and economic voting. Conceptual clarity and empirical testing

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  • Dieter Stiers

Abstract

Objective The main objective of the study is to distinguish the often‐used concepts and measures of retrospective (economic) performance voting. I argue that concepts that have been used synonymously—such as performance voting, retrospective voting, and economic voting—should be distinguished theoretically and empirically, as they address different phenomena. Methods I use the data of the fifth module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems to test differences in the correlates and effects of general retrospective performance evaluations and retrospective evaluations of the economy on incumbent voting. Results Both measures are associated with other valence evaluations and economic evaluations with the personal economic situation. Both measures significantly explain incumbent voting, but the effects of the general retrospective performance measure are stronger. Conclusion By distinguishing different concepts, theoretical confusion can be avoided. Given the differences in correlates and effect sizes, future studies should select their empirical measures carefully.

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  • Dieter Stiers, 2022. "Performance voting, retrospective voting, and economic voting. Conceptual clarity and empirical testing," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 103(2), pages 399-408, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:socsci:v:103:y:2022:i:2:p:399-408
    DOI: 10.1111/ssqu.13125
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