This article suggests that from a public policy perspective, some degree of adverse selection may be desirable in some insurance markets. The article suggests that a public policymaker should consider the criterion of "loss coverage," and that in some markets a policymaker may wish to regulate risk classification with a view to increasing loss coverage. Either too much or too little risk classification may reduce loss coverage. The concept is explored by means of examples and formulaic and graphical interpretations. An application to the UK life insurance market is considered. Copyright (c) The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 2008.
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