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Moral Hazard And Capital Budgeting

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  • Paul K. Chaney

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  • Paul K. Chaney, 1989. "Moral Hazard And Capital Budgeting," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 113-128, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfnres:v:12:y:1989:i:2:p:113-128
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1989.tb00107.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Radner, Roy, 1981. "Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(5), pages 1127-1148, September.
    2. Schall, Lawrence D & Sundem, Gary L & Geijsbeek, William R, Jr, 1978. "Survey and Analysis of Capital Budgeting Methods," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 33(1), pages 281-287, March.
    3. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, 1979. "Moral hazard and observability," LIDAM Reprints CORE 379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
    5. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
    6. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    7. Narayanan, M P, 1985. "Observability and the Payback Criterion," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(3), pages 309-323, July.
    8. H. Martin Weingartner, 1969. "Some New Views on the Payback Period and Capital Budgeting Decisions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 15(12), pages 594-607, August.
    9. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1979. "Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 231-259, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boyle, Glenn & Guthrie, Graeme, 2006. "Payback Without Apology," Working Paper Series 18957, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    2. Lefley, Frank, 1996. "The payback method of investment appraisal: A review and synthesis," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 207-224, July.
    3. Glenn Boyle & Graeme Guthrie, 2006. "Payback without apology," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 46(1), pages 1-10, March.
    4. repec:vuw:vuwscr:18957 is not listed on IDEAS

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