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Decoding Inside Information

Author

Listed:
  • LAUREN COHEN
  • CHRISTOPHER MALLOY
  • LUKASZ POMORSKI

Abstract

Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable “routine” insider trading that is not informative about firms’ futures. A portfolio strategy that focuses solely on the remaining “opportunistic” traders yields value‐weighted abnormal returns of 82 basis points per month, while abnormal returns associated with routine traders are essentially zero. The most informed opportunistic traders are local, nonexecutive insiders from geographically concentrated, poorly governed firms. Opportunistic traders are significantly more likely to have SEC enforcement action taken against them, and reduce trading following waves of SEC insider trading enforcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Lauren Cohen & Christopher Malloy & Lukasz Pomorski, 2012. "Decoding Inside Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(3), pages 1009-1043, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:67:y:2012:i:3:p:1009-1043
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01740.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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