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Unshrouding for Competitive Advantage

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  • Carsten Dahremöller

Abstract

In a market with hidden product details and systematic consumer biases, firms have the possibility to unshroud and thereby to rectify such market obliquities. While the classical view was that firms will have an incentive to unshroud, Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show that there exist constellations in which firms prefer to leave the market shrouded. Building on that model I introduce a more strategic and long‐term dimension of unshrouding which turns out to fundamentally alter the underlying incentives to unshroud. In particular, I show that there exists an incentive to unshroud that stems from differences in add‐on profitability and that it is dependent on parameter constellations whether a more profitable or a less profitable firm will want to unshroud.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Dahremöller, 2013. "Unshrouding for Competitive Advantage," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(3), pages 551-568, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jemstr:v:22:y:2013:i:3:p:551-568
    DOI: 10.1111/jems.12025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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