IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jecsur/v37y2023i2p189-238.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Concentration of power at the editorial boards of economics journals

Author

Listed:
  • Lorenzo Ductor
  • Bauke Visser

Abstract

Using a unique dataset covering 106 economics journals over the period 1990–2011, we document trends in the incidence of multiple positions, editorial duration and institutional background for 6192 board members. We put these figures into perspective using the literature on boards of directors and measures of market concentration. The picture that emerges is of a discipline with a high concentration of institutional and individual power, especially at the more prestigious journals. Evidence suggests this indeed matters: there is a strong negative association between editorial duration and journal impact.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Ductor & Bauke Visser, 2023. "Concentration of power at the editorial boards of economics journals," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(2), pages 189-238, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:37:y:2023:i:2:p:189-238
    DOI: 10.1111/joes.12497
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12497
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/joes.12497?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1111, June.
    2. Kodrzycki Yolanda K. & Yu Pingkang, 2006. "New Approaches to Ranking Economics Journals," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 1-44, August.
    3. Renee B. Adams & Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2010. "The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 58-107, March.
    4. Falato, Antonio & Kadyrzhanova, Dalida & Lel, Ugur, 2014. "Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 113(3), pages 404-426.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    6. James J. Heckman & Sidharth Moktan, 2020. "Publishing and promotion in economics - The tyranny of the Top Five," Vox eBook Chapters, in: Sebastian Galliani & Ugo Panizza (ed.), Publishing and Measuring Success in Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 23-32, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    7. Marcel Fafchamps & Sanjeev Goyal & Marco J. van der Leij, 2010. "Matching and Network Effects," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 203-231, March.
    8. Stephen P. Ferris & Murali Jagannathan & A. C. Pritchard, 2003. "Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1087-1112, June.
    9. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, April.
    10. Maurice Salles, 2014. "‘Social choice and welfare’ at 30: its role in the development of social choice theory and welfare economics," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 1-16, January.
    11. Szenberg, Michael, editor & Ramrattan, Lall, editor, 2014. "Secrets of Economics Editors," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262525461, December.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/67ft27s7u58ocangahl1jigu6p is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Sanjeev Goyal & Marco J. van der Leij & José Luis Moraga-Gonzalez, 2006. "Economics: An Emerging Small World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 403-432, April.
    14. M. Fourcade & E. Ollion & Y. Algan, 2015. "The Superiority of Economists," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 7.
    15. Marion Fourcade & Etienne Ollion & Yann Algan, 2015. "La superioridad de los economistas," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 17(33), pages 13-43, July-Dece.
    16. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Tommaso Colussi, 2018. "Social Ties in Academia: A Friend Is a Treasure," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 100(1), pages 45-50, March.
    18. Frederic S. Lee & Xuan Pham & Gyun Gu, 2013. "The UK Research Assessment Exercise and the narrowing of UK economics," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 37(4), pages 693-717.
    19. Ying Dou & Sidharth Sahgal & Emma Jincheng Zhang, 2015. "Should Independent Directors Have Term Limits? The Role of Experience in Corporate Governance," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 44(3), pages 583-621, September.
    20. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
    21. Masulis, Ronald W. & Zhang, Emma Jincheng, 2019. "How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(3), pages 226-256.
    22. Hauser, Roie, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 16-37.
    23. David N. Laband, 2013. "On the Use and Abuse of Economics Journal Rankings," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0, pages 223-254, August.
    24. Jinyoung Kim & Kanghyock Koh, 2014. "Incentives for Journal Editors," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(1), pages 348-371, February.
    25. David Card & Stefano DellaVigna, 2013. "Nine Facts about Top Journals in Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(1), pages 144-161, March.
    26. Hodgson, Geoffrey M & Rothman, Harry, 1999. "The Editors and Authors of Economics Journals: A Case of Institutional Oligopoly?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(453), pages 165-186, February.
    27. Ferris, Stephen P. & Jayaraman, Narayanan & Liao, Min-Yu (Stella), 2020. "Better directors or distracted directors? An international analysis of busy boards," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    28. Corsi, Marcella & D’Ippoliti, Carlo & Zacchia, Giulia, 2019. "Diversity of backgrounds and ideas: The case of research evaluation in economics," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
    29. M. Fourcade & E. Ollion & Y. Algan., 2015. "The Superiority of Economists," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 7.
    30. Laband, David N & Piette, Michael J, 1994. "Favoritism versus Search for Good Papers: Empirical Evidence Regarding the Behavior of Journal Editors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(1), pages 194-203, February.
    31. Brogaard, Jonathan & Engelberg, Joseph & Parsons, Christopher A., 2014. "Networks and productivity: Causal evidence from editor rotations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 251-270.
    32. Stein, Luke C.D. & Zhao, Hong, 2019. "Independent executive directors: How distraction affects their advisory and monitoring roles," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 199-223.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sihua Ding & Marcin Dziubiński & Sanjeev Goyal, 2021. "Clubs and Networks," Working Papers 20210073, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Dec 2021.
    2. Aistleitner, Matthias & Kapeller, Jakob & Kronberger, Dominik, 2022. "The authors of economics journals revisited: Evidence from a large-scale replication of Hodgson & Rothman (1999)," ifso working paper series 20, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute for Socioeconomics (ifso).
    3. Aistleitner, Matthias & Kapeller, Jakob & Kronberger, Dominik, 2023. "The authors of economics journals revisited: evidence from a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman (1999)," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 86-101, February.
    4. Stephan Puehringer & Georg Wolfmayr, 2023. "Organizers and promotors of academic competition? The role of (academic) social networks and platforms in the competitization of science," ICAE Working Papers 152, Johannes Kepler University, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lorenzo Ductor & Bauke Visser, 2021. "When a coauthor joins an editorial board," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 21-043/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    2. Ductor, Lorenzo & Visser, Bauke, 2022. "When a coauthor joins an editorial board," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 576-595.
    3. Masulis, Ronald W. & Zhang, Emma Jincheng, 2019. "How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(3), pages 226-256.
    4. Matthias Aistleitner & Jakob Kapeller & Stefan Steinerberger, 2018. "Citation Patterns in Economics and Beyond," Working Papers Series 85, Institute for New Economic Thinking.
    5. Carlo D'Ippoliti, 2021. "“Many‐Citedness”: Citations Measure More Than Just Scientific Quality," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(5), pages 1271-1301, December.
    6. Ann Mari May & Mary G. McGarvey & Yana Rodgers & Mark Killingsworth, 2021. "Critiques, Ethics, Prestige and Status: A Survey of Editors in Economics," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 295-318, April.
    7. Alqahtani, Jubran & Duong, Lien & Taylor, Grantley & Eulaiwi, Baban, 2022. "Outside directors, firm life cycle, corporate financial decisions and firm performance," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C).
    8. James J. Heckman & Sidharth Moktan, 2020. "Publishing and promotion in economics - The tyranny of the Top Five," Vox eBook Chapters, in: Sebastian Galliani & Ugo Panizza (ed.), Publishing and Measuring Success in Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 23-32, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
    9. Susan Elkinawy & Joshua Spizman & Hai Tran, 2021. "The effect of distracted audit committee members on earnings quality," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 1191-1219, April.
    10. Kathy Fogel & Liping Ma & Randall Morck, 2021. "Powerful independent directors," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 935-983, December.
    11. Gopalan, Radhakrishnan & Gormley, Todd A. & Kalda, Ankit, 2021. "It’s not so bad: Director bankruptcy experience and corporate risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 261-292.
    12. Ferris, Stephen P. & Jayaraman, Narayanan & Liao, Min-Yu (Stella), 2020. "Better directors or distracted directors? An international analysis of busy boards," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    13. Matthias Aistleitner & Stephan Puehringer, 2023. "Biased Trade Narratives and Its Influence on Development Studies: A Multi-level Mixed-Method Approach," The European Journal of Development Research, Palgrave Macmillan;European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI), vol. 35(6), pages 1322-1346, December.
    14. Kim, Keunyoung, 2022. "When are busy boards beneficial?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 437-454.
    15. Henrique Castro Martins & Cristiano Machado Costa, 2020. "Does control concentration affect board busyness? International evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 821-850, September.
    16. Martina Cioni & Giovanni Federico & Michelangelo Vasta, 2023. "Is economic history changing its nature? Evidence from top journals," Cliometrica, Journal of Historical Economics and Econometric History, Association Française de Cliométrie (AFC), vol. 17(1), pages 23-48, January.
    17. Rubin, Amir & Rubin, Eran & Segal, Dan, 2023. "Editor home bias?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(6).
    18. Stein, Luke C.D. & Zhao, Hong, 2019. "Independent executive directors: How distraction affects their advisory and monitoring roles," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 199-223.
    19. Kutubi, Shawgat S. & Ahmed, Kamran & Khan, Hayat, 2018. "Bank performance and risk-taking — Does directors' busyness matter?," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 184-199.
    20. Hauser, Roie, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Evidence from mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 16-37.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
    • A14 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Sociology of Economics
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jecsur:v:37:y:2023:i:2:p:189-238. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0950-0804 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.