IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/ecinqu/v60y2022i2p975-994.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Organizations and efficiency in public services: The case of English lighthouses revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Bogart
  • Oliver Buxton Dunn
  • Eduard J. Alvarez‐Palau
  • Leigh Shaw‐Taylor

Abstract

Foundational debates about public service provision originate with the study of private lighthouses in England and Wales. We provide a new empirical assessment of cost and technical efficiency of competing lighthouse organizations in the early 1800s. Those with more private control charged ships higher fees and had greater operating costs. Lights with more local representation and funding provided lights of more local use and were most cheaply maintained. Our results help explain why government promoted nonprofit organizations to run lighthouses over private operators. We provide new insights into the role of private enterprise and nonprofit organizations in public service provision.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Bogart & Oliver Buxton Dunn & Eduard J. Alvarez‐Palau & Leigh Shaw‐Taylor, 2022. "Organizations and efficiency in public services: The case of English lighthouses revisited," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(2), pages 975-994, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:60:y:2022:i:2:p:975-994
    DOI: 10.1111/ecin.13060
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13060
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/ecin.13060?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wolfgang Buchholz & Todd Sandler, 2021. "Global Public Goods: A Survey," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-545, June.
    2. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    3. Marco Buso, 2019. "Bundling versus unbundling: asymmetric information on information externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 1-25, September.
    4. Li, Sanxi & Sun, Hailin & Yan, Jianye & Yu, Jun, 2015. "Bundling decisions in procurement auctions with sequential tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 96-106.
    5. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Santiago Lago-Peñas & Agnese Sacchi, 2017. "The Impact Of Fiscal Decentralization: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 1095-1129, September.
    6. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2019. "Lighthouse Provision In Premodern Japan," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(3), pages 1582-1596, July.
    7. Johnson, Noel D. & Koyama, Mark, 2017. "States and economic growth: Capacity and constraints," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 1-20.
    8. Dan Bogart & Oliver Dunn & Eduard J. Alvarez‐Palau & Leigh Shaw‐Taylor, 2021. "Speedier delivery: coastal shipping times and speeds during the Age of Sail," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 74(1), pages 87-114, February.
    9. Martimort, David & Pouyet, Jerome, 2008. "To build or not to build: Normative and positive theories of public-private partnerships," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 393-411, March.
    10. Coase, R H, 1974. "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 357-376, October.
    11. Elodie Bertrand, 2006. "The Coasean analysis of lighthouse financing: myths and realities," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(3), pages 389-402, May.
    12. Dan Bogart & Gary Richardson, 2011. "Property Rights and Parliament in Industrializing Britain," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(2), pages 241-274.
    13. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2018. "The lightship in economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 479-506, September.
    14. Peter M. Solar & Luc Hens, 2016. "Ship speeds during the Industrial Revolution: East India Company ships, 1770–1828," European Review of Economic History, European Historical Economics Society, vol. 20(1), pages 66-78.
    15. Hausman, William J., 1977. "Size and Profitability of English Colliers in the Eighteenth Century," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(4), pages 460-473, December.
    16. Walter Block & William Barnett, 2009. "Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 1-13, July.
    17. Kelly, Morgan & Ó Gráda, Cormac & Solar, Peter M., 2021. "Safety at Sea during the Industrial Revolution," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 239-275, March.
    18. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-1161.
    19. Elodie Bertrand, 2006. "The Coasean analysis of lighthouse financing: myths and realities," Post-Print hal-03507599, HAL.
    20. Candela, Rosolino A. & Geloso, Vincent, 2019. "Why consider the lighthouse a public good?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    21. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 331-349, December.
    22. Jerald SCHIFF & Burton WEISBROD, 1991. "Competition Between For-Profit And Nonprofit Organizations In Commercial Markets," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 619-640, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Callais, Justin T & Geloso, Vincent, 2023. "The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Callais, Justin T & Geloso, Vincent, 2023. "The political economy of lighthouses in antebellum America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 154(C).
    2. Candela, Rosolino A. & Geloso, Vincent, 2019. "Why consider the lighthouse a public good?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Geloso, Vincent J. & Salter, Alexander W., 2020. "State capacity and economic development: Causal mechanism or correlative filter?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 372-385.
    4. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent Geloso, 2019. "Coase and transaction costs reconsidered: the case of the English lighthouse system," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 331-349, December.
    5. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2020. "The Lighthouse Debate and the Dynamics of Interventionism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 33(3), pages 289-314, September.
    6. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021. "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    8. Laurent Carnis, 2013. "The provision of lighthouses services: a political economy perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 51-56, October.
    9. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    10. Rosolino A. Candela & Vincent J. Geloso, 2018. "The lightship in economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(3), pages 479-506, September.
    11. Daniel D’Amico, 2010. "The prison in economics: private and public incarceration in Ancient Greece," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 461-482, December.
    12. Lazzarini,Sergio G., 2022. "The Right Privatization," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316519714.
    13. Élodie Bertrand, 2006. "La thèse d'efficience du « théorème de Coase ». Quelle critique de la microéconomie ?," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 57(5), pages 983-1007.
    14. Walter Block, 2010. "Rejoinder To Boettke On Coasean Economics And Communism," Romanian Economic Business Review, Romanian-American University, vol. 5(3), pages 9-30, September.
    15. Hoppe, Eva I. & Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 145-166.
    16. Walter Block & William Barnett, 2009. "Coase and Bertrand on lighthouses," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 1-13, July.
    17. Heatley, David, 2011. "Auckland Transport: Institutional Congestion?," Working Paper Series 4080, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    18. Jean-Etienne de Bettignies & Thomas W. Ross, 2010. "The Economics of Public–Private Partnerships: Some Theoretical Contributions," Chapters, in: Graeme A. Hodge & Carsten Greve & Anthony E. Boardman (ed.), International Handbook on Public–Private Partnerships, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    19. John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa, 2010. "Contracting out public service provision to not-for-profit firms," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 62(4), pages 784-802, October.
    20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023. "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 157(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:60:y:2022:i:2:p:975-994. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/weaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.