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The Slippery Slope Of Concession

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Author Info
JACK HIRSHLEIFER
MICHELE BOLDRIN
DAVID K LEVINE

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Abstract

"We show that with common knowledge and a common rate of time preference, the potential loser can always avoid wasteful conflict through a time-consistent series of small concessions. We examine how the failure of each of these assumptions may explain why conflicts arise. We also debate which actions may be helpful in such unfortunate circumstances." Copyright (c) 2008 Western Economic Association International.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00154.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 47 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Pages: 197-205
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Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:47:y:2009:i:2:p:197-205

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jack Hirshleifer, 2001. "Appeasement: Can It Work?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(2), pages 342-346, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hirshleifer, Jack, 1991. "The Technology of Conflict as an Economic Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 130-34, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Stergios Skaperdas, 2006. "Bargaining Versus Fighting," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 657-676, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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