Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Effect of the Board Composition and its Monitoring Committees on Earnings Management: evidence from Spain


Author Info

  • Beatriz García Osma

    (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid)

  • Belén Gill-de-Albornoz Noguer


We test whether corporate governance mechanisms promoted by best practice codes are effective in constraining earnings manipulation for a Spanish sample of quoted companies during the period 1999-2001. In particular, we analyse the association between earnings management and two key aspects of corporate governance: board composition and the existence of board monitoring committees. Our results show that board composition significantly determines earnings manipulation practices. However, the main role in constraining such practices is not played by independent directors, as UK and US based research suggests, but by institutional directors. No correlation is found between the existence of an independent audit committee and earnings management measures. Finally, the existence and composition of a nomination committee affects the role of independent directors in constraining earnings manipulation. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Corporate Governance: An International Review.

Volume (Year): 15 (2007)
Issue (Month): 6 (November)
Pages: 1413-1428

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:15:y:2007:i:6:p:1413-1428

Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Order Information:

Related research



No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.


Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Greco, Giulio, 2012. "Ownership structures, corporate governance and earnings management in the European Oil Industry," MPRA Paper 37198, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Javier Andrés Suárez & Elena Cabal García & Carlos Fernández Méndez & Camino Rodríguez Gutiérrez, 2013. "The effectiveness of the audit committee in Spain: implications of its existence on the auditor’s opinion," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 333-352, August.
  3. Carmen Lorca & Juan Sánchez-Ballesta & Emma García-Meca, 2011. "Board Effectiveness and Cost of Debt," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 100(4), pages 613-631, June.
  4. Ferrer García, Cristina & Laínez Gadea, José Antonio, 2013. "Detectando diferencias en la medición de la calidad del resultado: evidencia empírica para empresas españolas || Detecting Differences on the Earnings Quality Measurement: Empirical Evidence on Spa," Revista de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa = Journal of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Quantitative Methods for Economics and Business Administration, vol. 16(1), pages 5-28, December.
  5. Abdullah Iqbal & Norman Strong, 2010. "The effect of corporate governance on earnings management around UK rights issues," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 6(3), pages 168-189, July.
  6. C. Piot & L. Kermiche, 2009. "A quoi servent les comités d'audit ? Un regard sur la recherche empirique," Post-Print halshs-00537952, HAL.


This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:15:y:2007:i:6:p:1413-1428. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.